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Chapter 10 
LEARNING TO LIVE WITH THE OTHER 
GERMANY IN THE POST-WALL FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC 
Kathrin Bower 
The GDR could not be a foreign country; otherwise we would 
have run across it at some point. But it was definitely not 
domestic either. East Germany was so far away that it had 
disappeared from our map of the world. Not foreign. Not 
domestic. 
-Susanne Leinemann 
The ambiguity of the relationship between the two Germanys as neither 
foreign nor familiar lies at the heart of Susanne Leinemann's 2002 memoir 
about her experiences coming of age in the Federal Republic during the 
1970s and 1980s.1 Born in 1968 in Hamburg, Leinemann belonged to the 
generation of Germans for whom the Berlin Wall was at once an unques-
tioned feature of the German landscape and a barrier that rendered the 
German Democratic Republic nearly invisible. It was not until Leinemann 
traveled to East Germany in 1985 to visit her pen pal in Dresden that she 
began to feel a sense of kinship with the other Germany. She mused over 
the fact that the encounter with the real people of East Germany, with 
whom she formed lasting friendships, did not inspire the wish for a unified 
country, but rather stimulated anger at the injustice of the travel restric-
tions imposed on East German citizens.2 The wall was an impediment to 
freedom of movement, but the division itself went unquestioned. Although 
Leinemann's memoir represents only one account from the West German 
perspective, the general lack of curiosity and indifference she described 
until her visit to Dresden was characteristic of a majority of West Germans, 
who had largely made their peace with the division of the country by the 
Notes for this chapter begin on page 271. 
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1980s.3 The Federal Republic of the 1980s preferred to characterize itself 
as a postnational nation, loyal to the principles of the European Economic 
Community, an alliance that in tum would further help to assuage the 
nationalist blemishes of the past. East Germany for its part had at last 
achieved recognition as a sovereign nation on the world stage and contin-
ued to emphasize how its founding ideology of antifascist socialism dis-
tinguished it in body and spirit from the Federal Republic. While the West 
German government had modulated earlier rhetoric urging reunification 
in order to preserve prosperity and peace, the East German government 
insisted on the division as the basis for its self-definition and raison d'etre. 
Forward into the Past 
After forty years of separation, neither the West Germans nor the East 
Germans were prepared for the impact of reunification. But had the peo-
ples of the two countries developed separate cultural identities to such an 
extent that the dissolution of the border represented merely the illusion 
of a return to sociocultural community? Since the collapse of the East 
German state in 1989 and the subsequent suturing of divided Germany 
in 1990, scores of books and articles have been published on the economic 
and political conditions that led inexorably, or less so, to the demise of 
the GDR, as well as myriad personal accounts by East German citizens 
describing their ideological and critical distance to the state, their blink-
ered view of the world, or their cheerful memories of childhood guided by 
compliant citizenship and populated with the products of Ostalgie.4 Other 
accounts by East and West Germans offer perspectives on life after unifi-
cation and the perceived, real or imagined, differences between Ossis and 
Wessis as well as speculation on how long such differences will persist. 
It would certainly appear that in the early post-wall years Ossis and 
Wessis had become terms of cultural difference designating competing con-
ceptions of "Germanness," ironically undermining the myth of reunifica-
tion by revealing the otherness within the idealization of ein Volk. In the 
discussion to follow, I will first examine how the two Germanys managed 
and learned to live with their separation, and will then explore how the 
lingering effects of those lessons influenced responses to unification. How 
did the two Germanys define themselves during the years 1949 to 1989? 
Did the clash of political ideologies and social realities in the FRG and GDR 
outweigh any shared cultural history? How has the master narrative of the 
GDR state as an Unrechtsstaat (a state not based on the rule of law or the con-
stitution) largely dictated by a West German imagination affected relation-
ships between East Germans and West Germans? What steps are necessary 
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to establish a collective sense of responsibility and engagement with the 
past in pursuit of a truly unified future in a post-wall, renationalized 
Federal Republic? To offer some preliminary answers to these questions, I 
have selected a range of published protocols, memoirs, and essays as a basis 
for analyzing a variety of perspectives across generational and geographic 
boundaries in response to unification: Helga Konigsdorf's Unterwegs nach 
Deutschland (1995), Daniela Dahn's Westwiirts und nicht vergessen (1997), Jana 
Hensel's Zonenkinder (2002), Susanne Leinemann's Aufgewacht. Mauer weg 
(2002), and Claudia Rusch's Meine freie deutsche Jugend (2003).5 Although 
many more accounts could be considered, works by these five writers 
already serve to complicate overly simplistic views of East versus West 
Germans as Jammerossis and Besserwessis, while also shedding light on the 
complexity of the German-German relationship, past and present. 
In order to evaluate the impact of 1989 and beyond on the perceptions 
of Ossis and Wessis, it is first necessary to look back over the forty years 
of division and the history of East and West German relations that pre-
ceded it. From its very beginnings, the Federal Republic viewed itself as a 
provisional, partial state that would one day become whole again. When 
the Soviets issued a note of support for unification in March 1952, how-
ever, the conditions were unacceptable to the West German government 
and its American ally. Without democratic elections in all of Germany, the 
Americans insisted, there could be no unification or peace agreement.6 As 
the Cold War heated up, it became obvious that the Western Allies and the 
Soviets would not reconcile their differences on the terms of unification. 
In the first two decades of its existence, the Federal Republic arrogated to 
itself the right to speak for Germany as a whole (Alleinvertretungsanspruch), 
because it alone had a democratically elected government. In tandem with 
this assertion of voice, the Federal Republic sought to deter other coun-
tries from recognizing the sovereignty of the GDR by refusing to establish 
diplomatic relations with countries that did so (with the exception of the 
Soviet Union).7 Although West Germany and East Germany signed a basic 
treaty in 1972 in which each recognized the other country's sovereignty, 
West Germany tacitly continued to regard itself as the only legitimate 
German government, evidenced by its policy of automatically granting 
citizenship to any East German who wished to live in the Federal Republic. 
Mirror, Mirror on the Wall 
During four decades of division, each Germany developed images of the 
other that served as foils. West Germany contrasted its democratic politi-
cal system and capitalist economy with the socialist dictatorship in East 
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Germany, while East Germany touted its own antifascist credentials and 
portrayed the Federal Republic's commitment to capitalist democracy as the 
continuity of fascism by other means. As a counter to the coupling of West 
Germany's acceptance into NATO and its rising economy, which could 
easily absorb reparations payments to the victims of the Holocaust, East 
Germany's antifascist origin story not only denied shared responsibility for 
World War II, but also firmly established its moral superiority as the "better" 
Germany. In this version of history, the line between the two Germanys had 
miraculously been drawn so as to divide the fascists from the communists, 
separating them into discrete geographic compartments. The construction 
of the Berlin Wall in 1961, with its SEO label as an antifascist protective bul-
wark, only reinforced the idea of a demarcation line. The wall itself came 
to serve as a kind of projection screen for images of the other Germany 
and as an affirmation of each state's core values. In his 1982 story Der 
Mauerspringer, West German writer Peter Schneider described the wall as a 
mirror that reflected the Federal Republic's sense of superiority while also 
obscuring any real interest in what lay beyond it: "the wall became a mirror 
for the West Germans, telling them day after day who was the fairest in the 
land. Whether there was life beyond the death strip soon became a matter 
of interest only to pigeons and cats."8 As a mirror for the West's narcissistic 
satisfaction with its political and economic system, the wall seemed to have 
only one side, oddly mimicking in reverse the official maps of the GDR 
capital issued by the East German government, which showed nothing but 
blank space where the streets of West Berlin should have been.9 
At once a border and a threshold, the wall symbolized the confronta-
tion between two different ideologies, as well as their mutual mission 
of repression and denial. In an analysis of the division and subsequent 
unification of the Federal Republic, political scientist Wolf Wagner noted 
that the projection of totalitarianism onto the GDR made it easier for the 
Federal Republic to repress or deny the fascist continuities in its own 
government, as well as its persecution of communists, 10 while the projec-
tion of fascism onto the FRG enabled the Democratic Republic to repress 
or ignore its own totalitarian tendencies.11 For his part, anthropologist 
Dominic Boyer portrayed each Germany's projection of negative qualities 
onto the other as the basis for their symbiotic relationship, noting that 
for each "the 'truly' forward-looking Germany defined itself in opposi-
tion to the backward glance of the other Germany. For each Germany, 
the other represented the national-cultural past against which its ideal 
national-futurity could be measured. Neither Germany, in the end, made 
sense without the other."12 While consumed with casting aspersions on 
each other's politics and morality, each Germany studiously disregarded 
the resistance to fascism in the other, with the exception of the politically 
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neutral White Rose.13 The willful blindness toward morally redemptive 
activities on both sides of the wall at the state level was offset by an 
exaggerated indulgence toward the GDR on the part of West German 
leftists. Whether due to blindness or indulgence, the foundation for such 
misperceptions resulted from a combination of indifference and ignorance 
regarding real existing conditions in the GDR.14 
By the mid-1970s, the two Germanys had reached a level of wary coex-
istence and mutual recognition codified in the basic treaty of 1972, but 
remained at odds on the issue of unification. For the East German gov-
ernment, the treaty was a vehicle for cementing its identity as a separate 
state, distinct from the Federal Republic on ideological grounds that pre-
cluded any ZusammengehOrigkeitsgefiihl (shared sense of belonging).15 In a 
report to the Central Committee of the SEO in May 1973, Erich Honecker 
was adamant that no special relationship existed between the GDR and 
the FRG, and denied any unity between the two states: "The GDR is not 
part of the FRG and the FRG is not part of the GDR."16 The West German 
government took a more ambivalent course. The Federal Republic con-
tinued to see itself as the legitimate representative of the German nation 
and in a judgment passed by the Federal Constitutional Court in July 
1973 affirmed the two-states-one-nation concept, arguing that the "The 
German Democratic Republic belongs to Germany and cannot be seen as 
a foreign country in relation to the Federal Republic of Germany."17 
Despite the FRG's official commitment to unification, the two coun-
tries increasingly drifted apart, divided by ideological differences, social 
values, and a deadly border. As time passed, West Germans became less 
and less interested in unification and had comfortably reconciled them-
selves to life on the more prosperous side of the wall. In his review of 
polling data from the mid-1980s, Hans-Georg Betz observed that over 
half of the West Germans polled between the ages of 14 and 29 regarded 
East Germans as a separate people and viewed East Germany as a foreign 
country.18 Other studies showed that some two-thirds of West German 
youth had neither interest in nor knowledge of the GDR.19 It was not until 
the latter half of the 1980s when reforms swept the eastern bloc countries 
and Mikhail Gorbachev became a household name that West Germans 
began to take notice of what was transpiring in the GDR.20 
Migration, Revolution, Unification 
When Hungary opened its borders to Austria in the summer of 1989, 
thousands of East Germans took advantage of the opportunity and fled 
to the West in a wave of mass immigration that would continue unabated 
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until the GDR officially opened its own borders in November 1989. In a 
1997 article published in the now defunct journal East European Quarterly, 
political scientist Peter O'Brien suggested that "migration (or the threat 
of it) inspired the revolution and determined the collapse of the GDR" 
and also "set the pace and terms of unification."21 While one could argue 
that the mass defection of East German citizens did not so much inspire 
the revolution as represent a symptom of the problems with the GDR 
system, the hemorrhaging of able-bodied and well-trained young citizens 
was something the state could neither afford nor effectively stop by a 
show of force. For Daniela Dahn, a GDR writer, intellectual, dissident, 
and SED party member, the late 1980s represented a moment in GDR 
history in which the citizens had finally found their voice and the solidar-
ity and strength to express themselves: "Finally it seemed that futility 
had been vanquished and the age of meaning had dawned."22 The many 
discussions and forums she attended at that time were inspired by ideas 
of reform and not by the desire to emulate West Germany. Yet as events 
unfolded, it became obvious that reform of the derelict East German state 
was neither politically possible nor economically feasible and unification 
was seen as the best solution to the crisis. 
In August 1990, the GDR and the FRG signed a unification agree-
ment determining that the GDR would be incorporated into the Federal 
Republic according to article 23 of the Basic Law. On 3 October 1990, 
the German Democratic Republic together with the majority of its laws 
and civil institutions ceased to exist. This absorption of the GDR into 
the Federal Republic gave rise to assertions of colonization and the cre-
ation of a subordinate East German class paradoxically transformed into 
subalterns simultaneous with their recognition as de jure citizens of the 
Federal Republic. Despite their equal citizenship on paper, however, they 
were not seen as fully committed to the democratic principles of the uni-
fied state. In O'Brien's analysis, West Germans viewed both foreigners 
and East Germans as in need of resocialization "to respect the liberal 
democratic values of West German political culture."23 This perception 
of the East Germans' deficient democratic commitment was contradicted 
by their actual attitudes, reflected in the results of an Allensbach Institute 
survey in 1990 that showed East German and West German endorsements 
of democratic government to be virtually identical.24 
The sudden and sweeping erasure of the state that was once their coun-
try, combined with widespread prejudices and negative perceptions of 
life in the GDR held by West Germans, generated a sense of culture shock 
among East Germans in the expanded Federal Republic. As Wolf Wagner 
reported in his 2005 Kulturschock study, what had previously been normal-
ity for East Germans was equated with poverty, while at the same time East 
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Germans were struggling with pressing, present concerns about their live-
lihood in a new Germany where they felt humiliated and devalued.25 For 
some East Germans, it was as if they had become migrants without ever 
leaving their home. The sense of anomie that followed unification was dif-
ficult for many East Germans, while others welcomed the challenges of the 
transition. Regardless of how successful they were at negotiating life in the 
unified Federal Republic, almost half of East Germans responding to a 2003 
survey reported that they still felt like second-class citizens in the FRG.26 
Wende Migrants and German Auslander 
Despite the Federal Republic's implicit recognition of one people, two states, 
the Volk had indeed evolved in different ways as a result of forty years of 
socialization under oppositional political systems, lending some truth to 
the popular retort regarding the unification slogan '"We are one people.' 
'We are, too."'27 Building a sense of community to bridge the social and cul-
tural differences that grew out of political division is a slow process and the 
designations East and West German as well as their more pejorative cous-
ins Ossi and Wessi persist more than two decades after the so-called Wende 
or unification. As Peter Schneider prophetically predicted in 1982, the wall 
in people's heads would take much longer to dismantle than the physi-
cal wall that had divided the country.28 Public opinion surveys, historical 
analyses, and sociological studies provide insights into important facets of 
unification and its effects, but personal accounts offer a more fine-grained 
and multidimensional perspective that both individualizes and human-
izes the lives of respective German others before and after the wall. In the 
following discussion, I will look at examples of personal accounts by East 
and West Germans describing their relationships to the GDR state, their 
sense of identity in postunification Germany, and their perspectives on 
Ossis and Wessis: Helga Konigsdorf's collection Unterwegs nach Deutschland 
based on interviews with East and West Germans between 1990 and 1995; 
Daniela Dahn's Westwiirts und nicht vergessen (1997); Susanne Leinemann's 
Aufgewacht. Mauer weg (2002); Jana Hensel's bestselling Zonenkinder of 2002; 
and Claudia Rusch's alternate version of a GDR childhood in Meine freie 
deutsche Jugend published in 2003. 
Helga Konigsdorf's collected interviews with East and West Germans 
provide insights into geographic differences as well as generational 
ones. As a former citizen of the GDR, Konigsdorf enjoyed a success-
ful career as a mathematician and writer. After unification, she made a 
name for herself as a critical voice on the GDR past and the complexi-
ties of the German-German relationship in several collections of stories, 
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an autobiography, and two volumes of "Protokolle" offering a range of 
personal impressions on unification: Adieu DDR (1990) and Unterwegs 
nach Deutschland (1995). In the foreword to Adieu DDR, K6nigsdorf wrote: 
"Without changing our location, we enter a foreign land."29 Five years 
later, she assessed the situation somewhat differently: "Becoming one 
people was not difficult ... Being one people is more difficult than becom-
ing one .... Our relationship to history separates us more than it unites 
us."30 The competing historical narratives constructed to identify and 
justify the GDR and the FRG continued to exert influence on attitudes 
and perceptions after unification, complicated by the nearly wholesale 
rejection of GDR institutions, rituals, and social structure along with its 
designation as an Unrechtsstaat. The undifferentiated dismissal of the GDR 
as an Unrechtsstaat only served to deepen the divide between East and 
West, described by Konrad Jarausch, Hinrich Seeba, and David Conradt 
as a binary opposition between the good, liberal, and democratic West 
Germany and the bad, repressive, and communist former East Germany.31 
K6nigsdorf acknowledged that East Germans were tempted to invent new 
biographies for themselves as an alternative to accepting the negative 
image of their past that dominated West German perceptions: "And so it 
_ happens that everyone has their own truth in the end. The other's truth is 
painful when it calls one's life into question."32 In that atmosphere of inse-
curity and rapid change, K6nigsdorf envisioned her book as an invitation 
and inspiration to dialogue, especially to those uncomfortable with the 
pace and dimensions of unification. 
Unterwegs nach Deutschland is an apt title for a collection of multiple 
viewpoints on identity and belonging, concepts of freedom and democ-
racy, future possibilities, and missed opportunities in the transition 
from divided to united Germany. While K6nigsdorf's sampling was far 
from statistically significant, the diversity in responses among older 
and younger generation East Germans punctured any simplistic argu-
ments about a clear age divide in attitudes toward the GDR and the new, 
post-wall Germany. One university student interviewed in 1993 claimed 
that she would always be a product of the GDR and saw no reason to be 
ashamed of that fact. Yet she also felt abandoned by her parents' genera-
tion, who were so absorbed in transforming themselves that they did not 
take time to address the confusion felt by their children.33 A young man 
interviewed in 1990 insisted that the ideals of the revolution had been 
betrayed and he was concerned about a resurgence of fascism.34 Such con-
cerns are bolstered by views such as those expressed by a nineteen-year-
old Gymnasium student that right-wing extremism was a strong influence 
on the young people in his town and that it would have been better to 
keep Germany divided into two sovereign states.35 
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Among the older generation of East Germans, there were also a range of 
views, from those who felt betrayed by the SEO government because of the 
opportunities they missed to those who defended their service and alle-
giance to the GDR. In some cases, the defense of past actions blended with 
a supple mindset regarding the conditions for success in united Germany. 
The experiences of a former Stasi official interviewed for Adieu DDR illus-
trate the opalescence of attitudes not only across and within generations, 
but also within individuals. Whereas he still felt affinity with the East 
German state in 1990, by 1993 he claimed to have no identity, except per-
haps for a continued sense of being different from West Germans. In a tell-
ing statement, he equated his neutral feelings toward West Germans with 
his attitude toward foreigners in general: "I have never held prejudices 
towards West Germans. Now I'm going to say something really terrible: 
just as I've never held prejudices against any other foreigners."36 Despite 
a common language and a shared cultural heritage in which four decades 
of separation could be seen as a mere interlude, the sense of estrangement 
encouraged by division remained. 
Hierarchies of Belonging 
In contrast to Konigsdorf's postunification interviews with a diverse group 
of informants, Dahn, Leinemann, Hensel, and Rusch focused on their own 
experiences both before and after unification and used these as bases for 
more general assertions and assumptions about the state of Ossi-Wessi rela-
tions. Daniela Dahn's Westwiirts und nicht vergessen: Vom Unbehagen in der 
Einheit (1997) combines her reckoning with the process of unification with 
a critique of the double standard the new Federal Republic applied when 
reviewing GDR history. Dahn is a journalist, intellectual, writer, and criti-
cal voice from the GDR whose discomfort with unification was fueled in 
part by her resentment towards the devaluation of her past. Spurred by the 
West German presumption that East Germans are resistant to confronting 
the effects of a socialist dictatorship on their lives as GDR citizens, Dahn 
set out to balance the scales by showcasing "the modest advantages of 
the GDR and the immodest disadvantages of the Federal Republic."37 She 
rejected the view that critics of the GDR regime could only opt for exile 
or inner immigration, but acknowledged that dissidence and opposition 
came with a price: 
Not one of us succeeded in being a hero all of the time. We made compromises 
and paid for our courage to resist with phases of weakness. But the genuine 
books strengthened the need for civic courage, dignity, and truth. That our 
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product was a form of sustenance was evidenced by the long lines in front of 
bookstores and book bazaars .... Nobody can take that experience of being 
needed away from me.38 
Despite the surveillance, state controls, and socialization practices, 
Dahn described a vibrant culture of protest and dialogue that nourished 
the civic courage that enabled the Wende.39 Dahn is indignant about the 
Doppelmoral (double standards) she perceives in the Federal Republic's 
postunification master narrative of the GDR as an Unrechtsstaat and the 
implication that its citizens were complicit in their own oppression. As evi-
dence of the hypocrisy and uncritical self-perception of the West German 
position, Dahn pointed to the FRG's indulgent treatment of former Nazis 
who were entitled to state pensions despite their service to a fascist dicta-
torship.40 Dahn did not deny the injustices perpetrated by the GDR regime, 
but also refused to remain silent about injustices in the Federal Republic's 
political and social practices, specifically targeting the FRG's persecution 
of political opponents and dissidents under the auspices of emergency 
laws and the suppression of critique in the workplace.41 For Dahn, the 
nearly exclusive focus on surveillance and the state security apparatus in 
the GDR actually shored up the status quo in the FRG and represented a 
kind of colonizing mentality, obstructing progress toward genuine unifi-
cation.42 Most galling for East Germans in this context, Dahn contended, 
was the West German blindness to the faults and failures of their demo-
cratic system, combined with the assumption that East Germans should 
be grateful for this gift of democracy.43 
The West German expectation that East Germans were both unschooled 
in and uncommitted to democracy is a theme that comes up in other 
accounts of the Wende, and appears to be grounded in preconceptions 
and ignorance rather than actual experience. In a study on the political 
culture in united Germany published in 2010, Russell Dalton and Steven 
Weldon traced the results of surveys from the first two decades following 
unification and concluded that the majority of East Germans were strong 
supporters of democratic principles, but with differing expectations for 
democracy in practice than their West German peers, and on the whole far 
less satisfied with actually existing democracy in the Federal Republic.44 
In Westwiirts und nicht vergessen Daniela Dahn portrayed East Germans 
as critical, self-aware, and discerning in their engagement with their past 
as well as the realities of life in the Federal Republic, implying that their 
views and perceptions were and are both valuable and largely untapped 
resources for the future of a truly democratic and unified Federal Republic. 
As if in response to Dahn's depiction of the possibility and reality of 
political critique in the GDR and her call for a balanced confrontation 
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with the past in united Germany, Susanne Leinemann in Aufgewacht. 
Mauer weg painted a negative picture of the official West German pub-
lications used for the political education of youth in the mid-1980s, 
because of their dismissal of any oppositional movements in the GDR and 
their failure to acknowledge the impact of reforms in the Soviet Union 
under Gorbachev.45 As a result of this one-sided portrayal of the GDR, 
Leinemann claimed that she and her peers expected GDR citizens to be 
brainwashed zombies, an expectation that could only be dispelled by 
actually traveling to East Germany.46 When Leinemann spent time with 
her pen pal's family and friends in Dresden in 1985, she came to under-
stand and appreciate the East Germans as people. Although she initially 
romanticized the GDR social fabric as more textured, authentic, and direct 
than that of the FRG,47 she also came to recognize its roughness, deficien-
cies, and inhumanity, particularly evident in accounts of systemic abuse 
in the Nationale Volksarmee (NVA, National People's Army) training she 
heard about from her friend Andreas.48 
In contrast to Leinemann's personal experience of kinship and affin-
ity with her friends in Dresden, the FRG's official attempts to cultivate 
cross-cultural understanding and a sense of shared national history 
through youth group safaris into the wild East foundered on preconcep-
tions and stereotypes held by both sides that prevented genuine con-
nections with the realities of life in either Germany.49 Leinemann, whose 
generation of West Germans was considered apolitical, hedonistic, and 
consumer-oriented, argued that the youth trips organized by the West 
German government in the late 1980s were not so much attempts at cul-
tural outreach as they were lessons in appreciation for the wealth and 
opportunities offered by the Federal Republic.50 In Leinemann's account, 
the biggest obstacle for West German youth was not the perceived dif-
ferences, but rather the striking similarities they observed in their East 
German peers' desires and attitudes, including a focus on consumption as 
an element of the good life and disaffection with politics.51 The similari-
ties were powerful enough for Leinemann to refer to her generation and 
its counterpart in East Germany as twins,52 a familial comparison that 
ironically vanished once the division was lifted and the two groups had 
unimpeded views of each other. The relationship with her East German 
boyfriend Andreas, which Leinemann had cultivated and cherished 
despite or because of their forced separation, could not survive unification 
because of mutually disappointed expectations. Reminiscent of Dahn's 
critique of West German democracy, Andreas channeled his dismay at 
the rift between his vision of life in the FRG and the reality into relentless 
criticisms of West German society, which Leinemann countered with petty 
attacks on his limited cultural experience.53 
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Looking back at the events of 1989, Leinernann questioned the lack of 
solidarity and support in West Germany for the East German reform move-
ment and its quest for democratic government. Recalling the human chain 
East German citizens formed spanning the north-south and east-west axis 
of the GDR, Leinernann asked herself and her readers why West Germans 
did not follow suit, not only to show their support with the reformers but 
also to demonstrate that they understood change was corning to both sides 
of Gerrnany.54 In retrospect, the absence of an echo in the West could be 
read as political apathy or complacency fed by the sense that the FRG had 
already achieved the favored state of democracy that East Germans could 
only aspire to. Leinernann noted that after unification West German politi-
cians assumed the role of victors who looked down upon the East Germans 
as naive or as incorrigible socialists.5s In addition, East Germans were stig-
matized because of their origins according to West German stereotypes: 
"For us West Germans there was no such thing as a half-GDR citizen. 
Whoever had been part of it, now had to answer for everything-false 
antifascisrn, surveillance state, deformation by socialist education, moral 
cowardice, bad fashion sense, absent food culture ... "s6 While readers may 
take issue with Leinernann's appropriation of a collective voice for West 
Germans in general and for her generation in particular, her criticisms of 
official policies and individual practice in the interactions between West 
Germans and East Germans shed light on political and personal elements 
of unification affecting both sides. 
Like Leinernann, Jana Hensel has a propensity to generalize from 
her individual experience to that of an entire generation. In her bestsell-
ing memoir Zonenkinder, published in 2002, Hensel's childhood became 
"unsere Kindheit" (our childhood) and her account is peppered with pro-
nouncements of "wir haben" (we have), "wir wollten" (we wanted), and 
"unsere Eltern" (our parents) in an uncritical blend of first person sin-
gular and plural. Although Hensel has justly been criticized for fabri-
cating a homogeneous generational collective of East German youth,s7 
Zonenkinder in its own way attempts to counter the equally homogenized 
portrayal of life in the GDR as steeped in repression and misery. By recall-
ing the moments of transition, as well as the before and after of unifi-
cation, Hensel reconstructed a version of the GDR where ideology was 
subordinate to lived experience. The erasure of Heimat (represented by 
street names, school traditions and curricula, consumer products, and 
rites of passage) that accompanied unification impacted the lives of East 
German children and adults. Much of Hensel's book is about the difficulty 
of reconstructing memories in a landscape where everything that was 
once familiar has disappeared, causing her to compare her childhood to 
a museum without a name or address.ss Yet, when the wall fell, Hensel 
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insisted that she and members of her generation quickly adapted to the 
new conditions and were eager to forget their past.59 From Hensel's per-
spective, the eagerness to adapt was a generational characteristic borne of 
the desire to be accepted and not be perceived as inferior: "We were the 
sons and daughters of the losers, made fun of by the victors as proletar-
ians tainted by the odor of totalitarianism and reluctance to work. We did 
not intend to remain that way."60 As a result, Hensel claimed that she and 
her East German peers became hybrid East-West children,61 having more 
in common with their generational cohort in the West than with the gen-
eration that preceded them in the East.62 Nevertheless, as the first genera-
tion whose childhood experiences straddled division and unification, "the 
first Wessis from East Germany,"63 their acceptance as bona fide Wessis 
could only be partial because they did not share the same memories.64 The 
children of the Zone referred to in Hensel's title are thus at once hybrids of 
East and West and products of a space in a state of becoming where they 
could take charge of their relationship to the past.65 
Five years older than Jana Hensel, Claudia Rusch completed her sec-
ondary schooling in the GDR and characterized her peer group as the last 
genuine Ossis, as well as the first new Wessis in the ironically titled collec-
tion of tales from her childhood in the GDR, Meine freie deutsche fugend.66 
Unlike Hensel, Rusch grew up in a household opposed to the SEO regime 
and committed to reform (her mother was a close friend of dissident Robert 
Havemann), guided and guarded by parents who sought to inoculate her 
against the influence of the state. Although as a child she often wished that 
she could have fit in better with her peers, in retrospect, Rusch felt she had 
a privileged childhood because she was aware of the GDR's deficiencies 
from a young age.67 While Hensel's Zonenkinder portrayed GDR childhood 
as one dominated by rituals and consumer products that generated a sense 
of belonging that went largely unquestioned, Rusch had no interest in 
contemplating a GDR revival of any kind and rejected the nostalgia for 
East German products as uncritical sentimentality.68 For Rusch, the depri-
vations she was aware of as a child were countered by the desire to one 
day become French and live in France.69 It was not until the collapse of 
the GDR that Rusch discovered her loyalty to what one could call the 
"other" GDR, the human potential to resist the repressive tendencies of 
the socialist dictatorship and thereby give lie to the stereotype that all East 
German citizens were conformists and fellow travelers: "We were also the 
GDR. Not only spies and careerists, but also our families and friends lived 
here. Not only were those who wanted to press us into their preconceived 
molds part of this country, but also those who woke us up."70 
As the daughter of dissident parents who recognized that their child 
did not have a future in the country they were committed to reforming, 
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Rusch was torn by conflicting emotions when she learned after the Wende 
that her parents were determined to help her realize her dream of moving 
to France, even if it meant never seeing her again. Her anger at the state's 
power over human relationships prevented her from feeling any inclination 
to either forgive or downplay the crimes committed by the GDR regime, 
most insidiously its capacity to destroy family life.71 Reflecting on how her 
East German biography continued to affect her, despite her sense of libera-
tion after 1989, Rusch admitted that the GDR had not vanished from her 
consciousness just because the country had ceased to exist, but instead con-
tinued to exert its influence over her through what she called "the absence 
of self-evidence."72 This reference to a lack of naturalness or self-evidence 
even after the fall of the wall represented a condition of alterity that was at 
once more subtle and more complex than the terms Ossi and Wessi imply. 
A sense of self-consciousness inexplicable to West Germans and western 
Europeans about her freedom of movement and international friendships 
imbued her psyche, setting her apart from those who had grown up taking 
mobility and a cosmopolitan worldview for granted.73 
Embracing the Inner Ampelmi:innchen? 
Taken together, the selections from Helga Konigsdorf, Daniela Dahn, 
Susanne Leinemann, Jana Hensel, and Claudia Rusch offer a far more dif-
ferentiated picture of East Germany and Ossi-Wessi relations than what 
is conveyed in the equation GDR = Unrechtsstaat and the nearly myopic 
focus on the state security apparatus that predominates in the official 
stock-taking of the East German past. Although Dahn and Hensel's remi-
niscences are almost at opposite ends of the spectrum, a divergence that 
can only in part be explained by their difference in generation (Dahn was 
born in 1949 and Hensel in 1976), both resented the imbalance in expecta-
tions regarding the history of the GDR versus the FRG. For Dahn, it was 
the FRG's foregrounding of the GDR's injustices without accompanying 
attention to the flaws in its democratic system both past and present. 
For Hensel, it was the assumption that the memories and personal biog-
raphies of East German citizens were of no interest, and consequently 
that there was nothing more worth saying about the GDR past.74 In both 
cases, the dominant discourse and perceptions discouraged accounts of 
normal life in East Germany, which in all of its complexity and banality 
also included moments of happiness and triumph. In her demand that 
"We must be allowed to remember the normal, pleasant, and upstand-
ing moments of our earlier life,"75 Daniela Dahn expressed the need 
and desire to balance criticism and self-affirmation, a balance that was 
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perhaps most closely achieved by Claudia Rusch, whose indefatigable 
joie de vivre infused the pages of Meine freie deutsche f ugend. 
Despite the diversity of voices represented in memoirs and essays about 
life in the GDR, more than two decades after unification the fascination 
with the East German state security apparatus shows little sign of abating. 
Films such as Das Leben der Anderen (2006) have fanned public interest, 
and the award-winning TV series WeijJensee broadcast on ARD brought 
the experiences of a fictional Stasi family in episodes festooned with GDR 
cliches into German living rooms. The Stasi prisons and archive are tour-
ist attractions and books such as Ruth Hoffmann's Stasikinder. Aufwachsen 
im Uberwachungsstaat (2012) serve as companion pieces to stories about 
the lives of ordinary East German citizens. Historian Mary Fulbrook was 
an early voice among scholars to criticize the wholesale condemnation of 
the GDR state and has enjoined Germans of all stripes to embrace a more 
differentiated and pluralistic view of the divided past that unites them. 
For Fulbrook, it is "the plurality of debate on values and virtues-without 
necessarily a scapegoated other as the essential counterpoint" that will 
allow East and West Germans to establish a shared sense of identity.76 The 
ubiquity of the Ampelmiinnchen at crosswalks or the cultivation of Ostalgie 
through niche markets and the tourist magnet DOR Museum in Berlin 
do little to offset the prevailing view that equates East Germany with the 
Stasi. Both representations of the GDR, as a surveillance state and a place 
of homey nostalgia, deny the multidimensionality of a past that is an 
integral part of the legacy and national identity of all citizens in today's 
Federal Republic. 
To return to one of the questions raised at the beginning of this chapter, 
what steps are necessary to establish a collective sense of responsibility 
and engagement with the past in pursuit of a truly unified future? In 
other words, how can the "Germans" in all of their multiplicity come to 
recognize and accept their diversity as a core value, and in the particular 
case of East Germans and West Germans, learn to live with the complex 
and contradictory experiences and memories of the other Germany? One 
hopeful example is the initiative Dritte Generation Ostdeutschland and its 
network component 3te Generation Ostdeutschland, which seeks to harness 
the experiences and insights of those whose biographies bridge East and 
West to shape a future that is more attentive to the relationship between 
personal and political history and more attuned to the responsibilities of 
the present. The emphasis on Ostdeutschland in the title is an intentional 
effort to recover and unpack the GDR legacy from multiple perspectives 
in dialogues spanning generations across the new and old Bundesliinder 
(German federal states, the "Liinder").77 In many ways, 3te Generation 
Ostdeutschland is a continuation and an expansion of the project that 
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Helga Konigsdorf launched with Adieu DDR in 1990, motivated by the 
belief in the importance of individual stories. The book Dritte Generation 
Ost, published in 2012 with contributions from thirty-three individuals, 
demonstrated that there are still many stories left to tell, while the 3te 
Generation network has created a forum for communication and dialogue. 
Although the Dritte Generation Ostdeutschland initiative is to be applauded 
for its efforts to celebrate the value of East German experiences and their 
potential for invigorating the Germany of today and tomorrow, with its 
backward glance at only one side of a divided country it neglects the work 
of memory that West Germans must engage in as well regarding the pre-
unification FRG. It is the shared commitment to recognize and interrogate 
the merits, deficiencies, ideals, and hypocrisies of both Germanys that is 
needed to break through the lingering metaphorical wall between Ossis 
and Wessis and thereby bring Germans in all regions of the postunification 
Federal Republic closer to parity in citizenship even as economic dispari-
ties persist. 
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